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Abstract. This paper extends a previous model where we examined
the markets' microstructure dynamics by using Genetic Programming as
a trading rule inference engine, and Self Organizing Maps as a cluster-
ing machine for those rules. However, an assumption we made in that
model was that clusters, and thus trading strategy types, had to remain
the same over time. This assumption could be considered unrealistic,
but it was necessary for the purposes of our tests. For this reason, in
this paper we extend this model by relaxing this assumption. Hence our
framework does not lie on pre-specied types, nor do these types remain
the same throughout time. This allows us to investigate the dynamics
of market behavior and more specically whether successful strategies
from the past can be successfully applied to the future. In the past, we
investigated this phenomenon by using a simple tness test. Neverthe-
less, a drawback of that approach was that because of its simplicity, it
could only oer limited understanding of the complex dynamics of mar-
ket behavior. With the extended model we can thus have a more realistic
view of the markets and hence draw safer conclusions about their behav-
ior. Empirical results show that market behavior is non-stationary, and
thus agents' strategies need to continuously co-evolve with the market,
in order to remain eective.
Key words: Genetic Programming, Self-Organizing Maps, Market Mi-
crostructure, Market Behavior
1 Introduction
In a previous work [3], we investigated the dynamics of fractions of trading strat-
egy types that exist in nancial markets. That study used Genetic Programming
(GP) [11] to infer trading rules and Self Organizing Maps (SOM) [10] for clus-
tering these rules into trading strategy types. However, an important assumption
of that study was that maps (and thus strategy types) among dierent time
periods remained the same. The reason for doing this was because we wanted
to allow cross-period comparison among clusters from dierent SOMs. We could
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not meaningfully have done this without something like topological equivalence,
which could not sustain without the constancy of the types. In this paper, we
relax the above assumption, since our current work does not require any cross-
period comparisons. Thus one contribution of this paper is that we extend our
previous model by using a more dynamic approach, where we allow the types
of trading strategies to change throughout time. This modication allows us to
investigate the market behavior dynamics in more details.
Our motivation behind this investigation is inspired by observations made
under articial market simulations [1, 4], which suggest that the behavior of -
nancial markets is non-stationary. This basically means that this behavior cannot
cycle, but instead it follows a linear path. An important implication of this is
that trading strategies need to continuously co-evolve with the markets; if they
don't, then they become obsolete or dinosaurs [1, 9].
Recently [9], we investigated the plausibility of this phenomenon under em-
pirical datasets and found that after applying a strategy from the past to a future
time period, this strategy could not perform as successfully as it originally did.
This thus veried the previous observations under articial markets. However, in
that work [9], we only used a GP framework, where we inferred trading rules and
then observed the tness of those rules over time. A pitfall of that approach was
that because of the simplicity of that methodology, those results oered limited
understanding of the complex dynamics of market behavior.
In this paper, we present preliminary results from a more rigorous approach,
where we apply the extended framework of [3], which as we have said uses both
GP and SOM. This brings us to the second contribution of this paper. Using
the above techniques oers a more realistic modeling of the market, and allows
us to draw more accurate conclusions about the behavior of nancial markets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the methods
used for our tests, namely GP and SOM, and also explains our motivation for
using them. Section 3 briey presents the GP algorithm we have used. Section
4 then presents the experimental designs, and Sect. 5 presents and discusses the
results of our experiments. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes this paper.
2 Methods
2.1 Genetic Programming as a Rule-Inference Engine
In this paper, we assume that traders' behavior, including price expectations
and trading strategies, is either not observable or not available. Instead, their
behavioral rules have to be estimated by the observable market price. In order
to estimate these rules, we use Genetic Programming (GP).
The use of GP is motivated by considering the market as an evolutionary
and selective process.3 In this process, traders with dierent behavioral rules
participate in the markets. Those behavioral rules which help traders gain lucra-
tive prots will attract more traders to imitate, and rules which result in losses
3 See [13, 14] for his eloquent presentation of the Adaptive Market Hypothesis
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will attract fewer traders. An advantage of GP is that it does not rest upon any
pre-specied class of behavioral rules, like many other models in the agent-based
nance literature [2]. Instead, in GP, a population of behavioral rules is randomly
initiated, and the survival-of-the-ttest principle drives the entire population to
become tter and tter in relation to the environment. In other words, given the
non-trivial nancial incentive from trading, traders are aggressively searching
for the most protable trading rules. Therefore, the rules that are outperformed
will be replaced, and only those very competitive rules will be sustained in this
highly competitive search process.4
Hence, even though we are not informed of the behavioral rules followed by
traders at any specic time horizon, GP can help us infer what these rules are
approximately by simulating the evolution of the microstructure of the market.
Traders can then be clustered based on realistic, and possibly complex behavioral
rules.5 The GP algorithm used to infer the rules is presented in Sect. 3.
2.2 Self Organizing Maps for Clustering
Once a population of rules is inferred from GP, it is desirable to cluster them
based on a chosen similarity criterion so as to provide a concise representation
of the microstructure. The similarity criterion which we choose is based on the
observed trading behavior. Based on this criterion, two rules are similar if they
are observationally equivalent or similar, or, alternatively put, they are similar
if they generate the same or similar market timing behavior.
Given the criterion above, the behavior of each trading rule can be repre-
sented by its series of market timing decisions over the entire trading horizon,
for example, 6 months. Therefore, if we denote the decision \buy" by \1" and
\not-to-buy" by \0", then the behavior of each rule is a binary vector. The di-
mensionality of these vectors is then determined by the length of the trading
horizon. For example, if the trading horizon is 125 days long, then the dimen-
sion of the market timing vector is 125. Once each trading rule is concretized
into its market timing vector, we can then easily cluster these rules by applying
Kohonen's Self-Organizing Maps to the associated clusters.
The main advantage of SOMs over other clustering techniques such as K-
means is that the former can present the result in a visualizable manner so that
we can not only identify these types of traders, but also locate their 2-dimensional
position on a map, i.e., a distribution of traders over a map. dynamics of the
microstructure directly as if we were watching the population density on a map
over time.
What we have discussed so far is presented in Fig. 1, where a 3  3 SOM
is presented. Here, 500 articial traders are grouped into nine clusters. The
4 It does not mean that all types of traders surviving must be smart and sophisti-
cated. They can be dumb, naive, randomly behaved or zero-intelligent. Obviously,
the notion of rationality or bounded rationality applying here is ecological [15, 6].
5 [5] provides the rst illustration of using genetic programming to infer the behavioral
rules of human agents in the context of ultimatum game experiments. Similarly, [7]
uses genetic algorithms to infer behavioral rules of agents from market data.
4 M. Kampouridis, S.-H. Chen and E. Tsang
parameter value `500' refers to the population size used in GP, i.e., the rule-
inference stage, whereas the parameter value `9' is due to a 33 two-dimensional
SOM employed in the rule clustering stage. In a sense, this could be perceived
as a snapshot of a nine-type agent-based nancial market dynamics. Traders of
the same type indicate that their market timing behavior is very similar. The
market fraction or the size of each cluster can be seen from the number of traders
belonging to that cluster. Thus, we can observe that the largest cluster has a
market share of 71.2% (356/500), whereas the smallest one has a market share
of 0.2% (1/500).
Fig. 1. Example of a 3  3 Self-Organizing Map
3 GP Algorithm
Our GP is inspired by a nancial forecasting tool, EDDIE [12, 8], which applies
genetic programming to evolve a population of nancial advisors, or, alterna-
tively, a population of market-timing strategies, which guide investors on when
to buy or hold. These market timing strategies are formulated as decision trees,
which, when combined with the use of GP, are referred to as Genetic Decision
Trees (GDTs). Our GP uses indicators commonly used in technical analysis:
Moving Average (MA), Trader Break Out (TBR), Filter (FLR), Volatility (Vol),
Momentum (Mom), and Momentum Moving Average (MomMA).6. Each indi-
cator has two dierent periods, a short- and a long-term one, 12 and 50 days
respectively.
6 We use these indicators because they have been proved to be quite useful in previous
works like [8]
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Each of these market-timing strategies (GDTs) is syntactically (grammati-
cally) produced by the Backus Naur Form (BNF). Figure 2 presents the BNF
grammar of the GP. As we can see, the root of the tree is an If-Then-Else state-
ment. Then the rst branch is a Boolean (testing whether a technical indicator
is greater than/less than/equal to a value). The `Then' and `Else' branches can
be a new GDT, or a decision, to buy or not-to-buy (denoted by 1 and 0). Thus,
each individual in the population is a GDT and its recommendation is to buy (1)
or not-buy (0). Depending on the classication of the predictions we can have
<Tree> ::= If-then-else <Condition> <Tree> <Tree> j Decision
<Condition> ::= <Condition>\And"<Condition>j<Condition>\Or"<Condition>j
\Not" <Condition> j Variable <RelationOperation> Threshold
<Variable> ::= MA 12 j MA 50 j TBR 12 j TBR 50 j FLR 12 jFLR 50 j Vol 12 j
Vol 50 j Mom 12 j Mom 50 jMomMA 12 j MomMA 50
<RelationOperation> ::= \>" j \<" j \="
Decision is an integer, Positive or Negative implemented
Threshold is a real number
Fig. 2. The Backus Naur Form of the simple GP uses to construct trees
are four cases: True Positive (TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), and
False Negative (FN). As a result, we can use the following 3 metrics:
Rate of Correctness
RC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
(1)
Rate of Missing Chances
RMC =
FN
FN + TP
(2)
Rate of Failure
RF =
FP
FP + TP
(3)
The above metrics combined give the following tness function:
ff = w1 RC   w2 RMC   w3 RF (4)
where w1, w2 and w3 are the weights for RC, RMC and RF respectively, and are
given in order to reect the preferences of investors. For instance, a conservative
investor would want to avoid failure; thus a higher weight for RF should be used.
For our experiments, we chose to include GDTs that mainly focus on correctness
and reduced failure. Thus these weights have been set to 1, 16 and
1
2 respectively,
and are given in this way in order to reect the importance of each performance
measure for our predictions.
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Given a set of historical data and the tness function, GP is then applied
to evolve these market-timing strategies in a standard way. After evolving a
number of generations, what stands (survives) at the end (the last generation)
is, presumably, a population of nancial agents whose market-timing strategies
are nancially rather successful.
4 Experimental Designs
This section presents the experimental designs. But before we do this, let us rst
present some frequently used terms:
{ Base period, is the period during which GP creates and evolves GDTs
{ Future period(s), is a period(s) which follow(s) the base period (in chrono-
logical order)
The experiments were conducted for a period of 17 years (1991-2007) and the
data was taken from the daily closing prices of the STI market index (Singapore).
For statistical purposes, we run the experiments for 10 times.
Each year was split into 2 halves (January-June, July-December), so in total,
out of the 17 years, we have 34 periods7. The rst semester of a year will be
denoted with an `a' at the end (e.g. 1991a), and the second semester of a year
will be denoted with a `b' at the end (e.g. 1991b).The GP system was therefore
executed 34 times. Table 1 presents the GP parameters for our experiments.
As we have already mentioned, after generating and evolving strategies for each
Table 1. GP Parameters
GP Parameters
Max Initial Depth 6
Max Depth 17
Generations 50
Population size 500
Tournament size 2
Reproduction probability 0.1
Crossover probability 0.9
Mutation probability 0.01
one of the 34 periods, we then use SOM to cluster them into strategy types.
Then, in order to investigate whether the behavior of markets is stationary, we
re-cluster the GDTs of each base period, to all future periods' clusters. We want
to investigate is how \dissatised" these GDTs will be when they are moved to
future periods.
7 At this point the length of the period was chosen arbitrarily to 6 months. We leave
it to a future research to examine if and how this time horizon can aect our results.
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The process of this re-clustering is quite simple; let us give an example when
1991a is the base period. Each evolved GDT would rst be moved to the next
period, 1991b, and be re-clustered to one of the clusters of that period. In order
to `decide' which cluster to choose, the GDT compares the euclidean distance of
its market timing vector with each cluster; it is then placed to the cluster with
the smallest euclidean distance. The same procedure follows for all GDTs of the
population. At the end, the population of evolved GDTs from the base period
of 1991a has been reclustered to the clusters of period 1991b. We also follow the
same procedure with all future periods. This means that the GDTs from 1991a
are also re-clustered in 1992a, 1992b, ..., 2007b. Finally, the same process is done
for all other base periods (i.e. 1991b, 1992a, ..., 2007a).
Once these processes are complete, we can then move to calculate the dis-
satisfaction rate per period. In order to calculate it, we again use the euclidean
distance as our metric. Dissatisfaction rate of a GDT is therefore dened as the
euclidean distance of this GDT's behavior vector from the centroid of the cluster
it was placed during the re-clustering procedure. By repeating this process for
each GDT per period, we can then calculate how dissatised all GDTs are as
a whole, and thus obtain their average dissatisfaction rate, which will act as a
measure of how dissatised the population is every period. From now on, this
average dissatisfaction rate of the population of GDTs is going to be called as
dissatisfaction rate.
The logic of using the dissatisfaction rate is the following: we want to investi-
gate whether this dissatisfaction increases, because the GDTs have not adapted
to any changes that have happened in the market. In other words, we are inter-
ested in observing if unadapted strategies can still t in the market environment
(clusters) as well as they did in the past. If they do not, this means that their new
environment does not represent them as eectively as it did in the past; this thus
causes these strategies to be `dissatised'. If this dissatisfaction is quite high, we
consider these strategies to be dinosaurs, because their rules are not up-to-date
with the new market environment and as a result of this, they have become
obsolete. The implications of this is that markets' behavior is non-stationary,
but constantly changes, as Arthur rst observed in [1]. Thus, strategies need to
constantly co-evolve with the market and the changes happening in it, in order
to remain eective and survive.
Given a base period, the population dissatisfaction of all periods is normal-
ized by dividing those population dissatisfaction rates by the population dis-
satisfaction rate in the base period. Hence, each base period has its normalized
dissatisfaction rate equal to 1 and a returning dinosaur is a population of strate-
gies from future periods that has its normalized dissatisfaction rate less than or
equal to 1.
5 Results
In order to examine how often dinosaurs return, we iterate through each base
period and calculate the minimum dissatisfaction rate among its future periods.
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If, for instance, 1991a is the base period, then there is a series of 33 population
dissatisfaction values for its future periods. We obtain the minimum value among
these 33 values, in order to check how close to 1 this future period is. This process
is then repeated for 1991b and its 32 future periods, 1992a, and so on, until
base period 2007a. We thus end up with a 1  33 vector, called DissatisfVect
which shows the potential returning dinosaur per base period. In addition, we
repeat the above procedure under the following SOM dimensions: 2  1, 3  1,
2  2, 5  1, 3  2, 7  1, 4  2, and 3  3. The graphs of the DissatisfVect
vectors are presented in Fig. 3. Each line represents the results on a dierent
SOM dimension. What we can see from these graphs is that there are no base
Fig. 3. Minimum normalized population dissatisfaction rate among all future periods
for each base period. Each line represents a dierent SOM dimension.
periods with a minimum normalized dissatisfaction rate below 1. In fact, the
closest to 1 this rate gets is around 2 (1998a). Table 2 presents the average of
the minimum dissatisfaction rate per cluster and veries this observation. As we
can see, the minimum dissatisfaction rate is on average 3.56 for the 2 1 SOM
and it gradually increases as the number of clusters increases, reaching 5.79 for
the 3 3 SOM. Hence, the minimum dissatisfaction rate is on average quite far
from 1, which as we said is the threshold for a returning dinosaur.
In addition, Table 3 informs us that the average dissatisfaction rate per clus-
ter is even higher, and ranges from 5.17 (2 clusters) to 8.88 (9 clusters). It is
thus obvious that on average no dinosaurs return. But even if we want to take
into account the outliers (minimum dissatisfaction rate-Fig. 3), we can see that
while the rate can get relatively low, it never reaches 1. This leads us to argue
that dinosaurs do not return or return only as lizards. More specically, the
strategies (GDTs) found the new environments (clusters) very dierent from the
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ones in their base period and were very `dissatised'. The strategies that had
not adapted to the market changes could not t in the new environment.
Furthermore, Table 3 also informs us that the standard deviation of the
dissatisfaction rate is around 19-20%. This indicates that there are big upwards
and downwards movements of the dissatisfaction rate. This is also veried by
Fig. 3. This swinging reminds us of the Market Fraction Hypothesis (MFH) [3],
which requires a constant swinging (change) of the fractions of strategy types
that exist in a market. This is a very important observation, because it gives
us an understanding of why the dissatisfaction rate swings: similar clusters (i.e.
strategy types), to the ones of the base period, appear in the market. However,
as these clusters are not exactly the same as in the past, the dissatisfaction
rate cannot reach its minimum level and thus dinosaurs can only return as
lizards, as we saw in Fig. 3. The above observation leads us to conclude that
Table 2. Average Minimum Dissatisfaction Rate per Cluster
2  1 3  1 2  2 5  1 3  2 7  1 4  2 3  3
Mean 3.56 3.83 4.09 4.61 4.79 5.34 5.41 5.79
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Dissatisfaction Rate for STI per cluster
2  1 3  1 2  2 5  1 3  2 7  1 4  2 3  3
Mean 5.17 5.65 6.11 6.98 7.19 8.30 8.33 8.88
Stand. Deviation (%) 18.71 19.67 19.70 19.44 19.73 20.37 20.13 19.88
market behavior constantly changes. However, it can sometimes resemble old
environments. When this happens, old strategies might perform relatively well
again (i.e. dinosaurs returning as lizards). Nevertheless, unadapted old strategies
cannot reach performance levels equal to the ones they once had in their base
period (i.e. no returning dinosaurs). Market conditions have changed and unless
these strategies follow these changes, they become dinosaurs and thus ineective.
One nal observation we can make is that the dissatisfaction rate increases as
the number of clusters increases. This should not surprise us, since the increased
number of clusters has increased the sum of the dissatisfaction rates among the
500 GDTs, and thus has increased the average rate, too. What is important to
state, however, is that no returning dinosaurs are observed, under all trading
strategy types. The number of clusters does not aect the test's results.
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6 Conclusion
To conclude, this paper presented preliminary results under a model which used
Genetic Programming to infer trading strategies and Self Organizing Maps to
cluster these strategies. This allowed us to create a realistic model of market
behavior, where we could investigate an important property of articial agent-
based nancial markets. This property basically supports that the nature and
constituents of agents, and thus strategies, constantly changes; if these strate-
gies do not continuously adapt to the changes in their environments, then they
become obsolete (dinosaurs). In a previous work [9], we investigated this prop-
erty under empirical data. However, because of the simplicity of the test used
in that work, we also tested it in this paper, by using our more realistic model,
which combines GP and SOM. The model in this paper also served as an ex-
tension of another framework presented in [3]. Results showed that on average,
the dataset tested in this paper, STI, did not demonstrate the existence of re-
turning dinosaurs. The implications of this are very important. Old strategies
cannot successfully be re-applied to future periods, unless they have co-evolved
with the market. If they have not, they become obsolete, because the market
conditions have changed. They can occasionally return as lizards, meaning that
they can show some relatively good performance, but they cannot become again
as successful, as they initially were.
Finally, it should be stated that the above results are only under a single
dataset (STI). The next step of our research is to explore other nancial markets
and see if these results are a universal phenomenon.
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